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ART. VIII. — THE SITUATION IN FRANCE.

It might perhaps be not unreasonably imagined that the general similarity of the political influences now at work throughout Europe must be beginning to produce some similarity of results, and that distinct affinities must be becoming perceptible between the political conceptions of different countries. But scarcely anything of the kind has yet happened. The distinctions between the political dispositions of races are still, as a general rule, almost as marked as the differences of language. No two nations hold the same view of their political situation or of their political duties; no two nations have yet learned to apply the same precepts of guidance to their political working or the same remedies to their political difficulties. Here and there, it is true, the evolutions of the more advanced divisions of Liberalism do offer a certain appearance of international brotherhood, but the Conservatism of each country remains rigidly and exclusively its own. Each country in Europe has shaped its Conservatism for itself alone; and each national Conservatism goes its own way, in the conviction that it alone understands what it needs; each one acts for itself without the slightest reference to the others.

The diversity which exists between the many forms of Conservatism which have thus been developed has just been rendered remarkably apparent by the events which have occurred during the last four months in France. An attempt at "Conservative reaction" was commenced by Marshal MacMahon on the 16th of May: he suddenly turned out a Ministry which was supported by the Chamber; he dissolved the Chamber because it had supported the Ministry; and then he changed all the prefects and other functionaries, and publicly took every possible measure to influence the results of the new elections. In England particularly, in the birthplace and home of the highest, most intelligent, and most practical Conservatism of the time, reprobation was expressed with curious unanimity. The English press discussed the policy of Marshal MacMahon with a calmness, fairness, and thoroughness

which bestowed special value on its judgment, and it wound up by the declaration that, in its opinion, Despotism, and not Conservatism, is the true designation for that policy.

In order to clearly understand the considerations which have led English Conservatism to form this judgment, it is essential to remember that English Conservatism has assumed in our day a totally new character. It is therefore in reality, as events have now fashioned it, neither more nor less than an extremely prudent, slow-marching power of Liberalism.

Consequently, when English Conservatives proceeded to measure "the Act of the 16th of May," their first step was to inquire as to the precise object of that act; their second was to ascertain whether the object was being preserved by Constitutional means. On neither point did they obtain a satisfactory answer. The movement of the 16th May was most certainly Conservative, in the true European sense of the word, in so far as it claimed to be a struggle against Radicalism. And, furthermore, if it could be proved that each nation has really a right to a Conservatism of its own, unlike that of its neighbor, we should then be forced to recognize that the French are fully entitled to exercise that right, and to frame and practise their Conservatism as they may themselves think best, according to what may appear to them to be the necessities of their situation, without any reference to what is thought or done elsewhere. This is forcibly the argument which the French themselves employ towards their foreign critics; and, at first sight, there does appear to be some value in their reasoning. It seems to be just to urge that, as political tenets are evidently still generated everywhere by local forces, as the leveling impulses of the period have not succeeded thus far in unifying their shape, as their character still continues to be determined, in every land, by a collection of influences resulting from the history and temper of the people, and as those influences differ in every country in Europe, therefore those tenets themselves cannot be and ought not to be universally identical. And if there be variety in the tenets, there must, of necessity, be even more variety in the manner of applying them, for surrounding incitations make themselves felt in the direction of action almost as easily as in the formation of opinion. So far, and in these general terms, it may be owned that each nation is entitled to entire liberty of political fancy.

But does it not seem that this reasoning can be logically used by Liberals only? Is there not in the very principle and sentiment of Conservatism, when in its present calmed-down English form, something which rebels against the notion of variety and self-assertion? Can it not be argued that while modern Liberalism may justly be regarded as a product of accidents of time and place and things, and while, consequently, all Liberals may be thoroughly justified in claiming to form their creeds irrespective of each other, and to select their measures according to the special conditions in which they may personally find themselves placed, Conservatism, on the contrary, is a system which, by its essence and its mode of breathing, ought to rest everywhere on one general basis of unity and collectiveness, to present everywhere the same external features, and to resist everywhere the tendency to local transformations? Liberalism may be compared to Protestantism, with its indefinite capacity of variation, but Conservatism should, it seems to me, resemble Catholicism, with its identity of universal character. The work that Conservatism has to do is fundamentally alike all over Europe. The ferments which it has to calm and the ambitions which it has to moderate have become identical in nature, though they remain different in power, in all the countries of the Old World. The system of its action should therefore be substantially the same in all lands.

If these considerations can be regarded as valid, if Conservatism ought, by its own quality and in its own interest, to join hands all over Europe, it becomes difficult to allow that the French reasoning is sound and that there ought to be as many Conservatives as there are nations. Theoretically there should be only one European Conservatism. However large be the faculties of special action which may be conceded to local necessities, they should be limited to mere forms and processes; nothing ought to interfere with the maintenance of the great outline as an international whole. Conservatism ought to be everywhere fighting the same battle in the same way; it ought everywhere, without distinction of latitude, to be a system of check to the needlessly rapid development of Liberal aspirations, it ought to be everywhere, in its true sense, in its perfect meaning, a permanent obstacle to that development.

But the Conservatism of France is very different from all this. It is a fierce scheme of defence against Liberalism in any form whatever; it angrily repudiates concessions; its nature is essentially

combative ; force, not reason, is its preferred weapon ; it rejects all idea of uniformity of interests with other Conservatisms ; it sets up special rules of its own ; it acts for itself. Let us see what are the explanations which it puts forward in support of this attitude.

A preliminary observation must, however, be made here. The very first proposition which Frenchmen advance in discussions with foreigners is that the situation of France is so totally and so radically different from that of all other countries that strangers are necessarily incapable, from the simple influence of their surroundings, of forming a dispassionate judgment on it. It is asserted that no one but a Frenchman can understand the exact bearings of French questions, and that foreigners inevitably approach them in a condition of ignorance and of mental habit and prejudice which takes away beforehand all value from their criticisms. It is true that when foreigners happen to have praise to offer, they are complimented on their intelligence, their breadth of view, and their capacity for solving French problems ; but if they blame, they are at once reminded that it is not possible for them to know anything whatever of the matters which they presume to examine. It is necessary to begin by recognizing this difficulty and by accepting it as it stands ; no one can change it, the French will never admit that anybody can be right who ventures to suggest that they may be wrong.

This attitude of theirs need not, however, stop us. We can discuss their situation for our own instruction without presuming to offer them advice.

French Conservatives assert that the Act of the 16th of May, and the measures in support of it which have been successively adopted, have all been absolutely indispensable for the safety of the country. It is declared, with earnest conviction, by persons of experience and character, by persons inviting confidence and respect, that "society is in danger" ; and that if the late Chamber of Deputies had been permitted to live on, it would assuredly have voted away, one after the other, all the props of "moral order," and have gradually introduced legalized Radicalism as the principle and practice of government. It is affirmed that all sorts of risks are in the air, that another '93 is coming ; that the Radicals are rapidly becoming the masters of France ; and that, as soon as they are so, they will suppress religion, marriage, and the army, will enact that all taxes shall be payable by the rich alone, in proportion to their riches, and

will deliver up the land to the appetites of the lower classes. A cry of "Nous serons perdus" is in nearly all the drawing-rooms and in a good many of the newspapers.

It must be owned that all this makes up a gloomy picture, and that, if it were true, France would cease, for the moment, to be pleasant to live in. But is it true? And even if it is true, are the means which have been selected to combat the expected danger such as people who call themselves Conservatives ought to employ?

In seeking to verify the truth of the assertion that "society is in danger," it is necessary to take account not only of facts, but of apprehensions as well. We see a certain number of facts. We see that out of the five hundred and thirty-three deputies who composed the late French Chamber, three hundred and sixty-three were Republicans of various shades; that the rest were Legitimists, Orleanists, or Bonapartists; and that the Republicans had, consequently, a majority of about five to two. We see that of the three hundred and sixty-three some forty or fifty were violent Radicals; that these Radicals proposed an amnesty for the Commune, and that they brought forward some few other measures of a distinctly "subversive" kind; but we also see that both the amnesty and the other proposals were contemptuously rejected by the moderate Republicans as well as by the Conservatives. We see that on the 4th of May the whole Republican party did adopt an order of the day against, "Clericalism," but we also see that the very same men had previously voted an increase in the Church Budget. We see that the Republicans included in their ranks at least two hundred deputies who in any other assembly in the world would be counted amongst the ardent Conservatives, but who, because they have accepted the Republic, are indiscriminately called Radicals by the French Monarchists. We see that in all the elections which have taken place since 1871 France has manifested a constantly increasing desire to maintain the Republic; we see that the chances of the various Monarchical parties have proportionately decreased. And, as evident, undeniable facts, that is about all that we can see.

But when we turn to apprehensions, the field of contemplation becomes vastly larger. Fear is so feverishly inventive, it takes such small account of facts, that its developments have no fixed

limits. Facts, indeed, are obstacles in its way. So it either thrusts them aside or travesties them in such fashion that they cease to be recognizable. It seems to us that this is precisely what is happening in France, for we have extreme difficulty in keeping facts in view at all when we listen to the apprehensions expressed by French Conservatives, and when we read about apprehensions in French Conservative newspapers. Apprehension has carried them so far that, with all sympathy for them in the terrible position in which they say they stand, we are altogether unable to follow them; the speed at which they travel beats us. To correctly describe all their misgivings in detail would be to enumerate nearly all the known forms of social disturbance. A large number of most worthy French people appear, according to their own declaration, to be living in a state of permanent terror, in a cankering conviction that spoliation, ruin, and national convulsion are hanging over their heads. And in all this they are perfectly sincere; no one who knows them can doubt that they feel what they say, and that they fully believe it to be true.

Now, do the facts justify the apprehensions? Was the presence of fifty Radicals in the late Chamber a sufficient motive for the fright from which so many of the French are suffering? Is the prospect of a complete Radical triumph in the future so probable that all this terror must be regarded as natural? Is the general attitude of the Republican party menacing to "moral order"?

To these questions an impartial foreign on-looker can but answer, No. The peril is not real; it exists only in imagination. France is in no more danger of a Radical irruption than Germany or England is. The facts point to this conclusion, all the moderate organs of the Liberal press assert its accuracy, the Conservatives themselves are absolutely unable to prove the contrary. Even if we quote no evidence whatever from the Liberal side, even if we neglect all the vigorous and logical denials with which every accusation put forward by the Conservatives has been encumbered by their opponents, we still shall find in the testimony supplied by the Conservatives themselves sufficient proof that they have had no valid motive for their recent action.

During the debates which took place in June in the Chamber and the Senate, the Duc de Broglie and several members of his cabinet made speeches explanatory of the Act of the 16th of May,

and of the line of policy which they intended to pursue. We have read those speeches with care, with no preconceived intention, with full willingness to discover in them a demonstration that the Marshal has reason on his side, and, to our regret, we have been unable to unearth any proof whatever of the kind. Those speeches contain a good many general accusations, a good many vague assertions, a good many personal attacks; they are full of frequently repeated expressions of alarm, and of varied prophecies about the spread of "subversive ideas"; but in not one of them is there to be discovered a clear, intelligible statement of incontrovertible facts, such as is indispensable—in our eyes at least—to justify the great party movement which has been made and to define its precise objects. The movement was declared by every speaker to be directed against Radicalism, but no speaker was able to inform his hearers where Radicalism was and what it was doing. Indeed, the Duc de Broglie himself seemed to admit that the Radicalism against which he professes to be contending is not, at present, a tangible force, for, though he spoke of it as a danger so real and so terrible that it necessitated and justified all that has been done since the 16th of May, he admitted, at the same time, that its essential present characteristic is to be "latent." In substance, he acknowledged that the Act of the 16th of May was directed against fatal contingencies, not against actual realities; that its object was not to cure immediate evils, but to prevent France from drifting into worse difficulties; that it was an act of anticipation and prevision, based upon distrust of what might perhaps happen hereafter.

Now, in trying to appreciate this attitude, let us remember that, though by its recent political history and by the action of universal suffrage France is a land in which advanced Democratic ideas find numerous supporters, it is equally true that, by the temperament of its rural population, and by the wide distribution of property, the majority of its inhabitants are strongly Conservative in their inclinations. Two conflicting popular tendencies find themselves, therefore, face to face: one of them, by its nature, asserts itself more noisily than the other; but it by no means follows that greater noise means greater strength, and no error would be more complete than to suppose that, because French Democrats talk habitually more loudly than the Conservatives around them, they

therefore constitute a large party in the nation. The proportion of Radical electors in the country cannot, evidently, exceed the proportion of Radical Deputies in the Chamber, for the latter represent the former. We have just said that there were fifty of the latter in the recently dissolved Assembly, or one tenth or one eleventh of the whole; we may therefore argue, with every prospect of being right, that not more than one tenth of French electors hold Radical doctrines. Nine tenths are on the other side, — they are either moderate Liberals or Conservatives, either moderate Republicans or Monarchists, — and when we allow for the altogether special circumstance that the entire population votes, that any man above the age of twenty-one expresses his preferences at the poll, we can scarcely seriously consider that, in the present excited condition of opinion all over Europe, these proportions are remarkably bad.

Here lies the whole question. Are the French Conservatives right in protesting that the tenth, if left unchecked, may one day become a majority, or are we right in asserting that there are no reasons whatever for expecting that the tenth will augment in any important degree? In trying to judge the case we have, at all events, one advantage over the French, — an advantage which even they will not dispute, — we are not influenced by fear. We are keenly interested in the matter, but we have no fright about it, partly because it does not affect us personally, partly because we are convinced that there is no cause for fright. The situation is composed, as we have already said, of a mixture of facts and apprehensions; there can be no dispute about the facts, for everybody can see them, and they have just been enumerated over again with precision and authority in the address to his electors which M. Thiers drew up before his death, and which was published here on the 24th instant; the divergence is limited to the apprehensions on which, as we view the matter, the whole case of the French Conservatives is based. Our opinion is that the apprehensions are wildly exaggerated, and that, consequently, the case virtually collapses.

Of course French Conservatives have to defend themselves against the rising tide of Democratic claims; but the Conservatives of all other countries have to do the same, and we can detect nothing sufficiently grave in the position of the French as a

whole to entitle them to assert, as they do, that they are specially and particularly menaced by dangers which are proper to their own land alone. They have to contend against the same appetites, the same envies, and the same hates as we see at work everywhere else. We recognize that they are exceptionally powerful in France, — it is quite natural that they should be so, after all that has happened there ; but we recognize, at the same time, that France is in an equally exceptional position for struggling successfully against them, by ordinary means and without employing violence, for the good reason that the larger part of her population possesses property of some kind, and would therefore suffer in money by the adoption of revolutionary measures. The personal pocket-interest of the majority is a weapon of defence against Radicalism which exists in no country in the world excepting France. It suffices by itself to protect the nation from all real danger, and it may be trusted to do its work completely.

We therefore take the view that the attitude of the French Conservatives since the 16th of May has not been justified by either present facts or future prospects ; that it has been a purposeless outbreak ; and that under such conditions it cannot be considered as a true product of Conservatism.

But if its motive cause was not Conservatism, what was it ?

Since 1871 the members of the various Monarchical parties have preserved the hope either that France would voluntarily re-establish a throne, or that, if it silently accepted a Republic, the Republicans would commit excesses which would drive the nation back to a sovereign. But it has grown gradually obvious that, according to the seeming probabilities of the situation, neither one nor the other of these eventualities is likely to be realized, at all events for the present. On the contrary, it has been becoming more and more evident, not only that the Republican form of government is accepted without complaint, and even without a wish for change, by a majority of the people, but also that the Republican leaders fully perceive the risks of rough processes, and have taught themselves enough patience and enough self-control to be able to govern moderately and constitutionally. The Monarchists have therefore been obliged to recognize that their prospects are getting dull ; that the nation is slipping further and further from them ; and that their opponents are too prudent to supply, by their

own misconduct, arguments against themselves. It is then altogether natural that, under such circumstances, the Monarchists should incline to make an immediate effort to rouse the country in their favor and to profit by the Act of the 16th of May, in order to try to bring about an anti-Republican revulsion. But, true as this may be within certain limits, we are unable to attribute either to the Marshal or to the Duc de Broglie any original intention of utilizing the movement, if it happened to succeed, in order to bring about a Restoration.

Our reason for this opinion is that success at the coming elections would instantly break up the so-called "Conservative Union" into hostile sections; that the new majority would be destroyed by its own dissensions the instant it was created; and that no majority at all would remain available for the choice of a sovereign. It is difficult enough as it is — we see that each day — to hold together the discordant elements of the "Union"; even the urgent necessities of the common struggle against the Left are insufficient to prevent its members from quarrelling amongst themselves. What then would be their attitude towards each other after a success? No, — Monarchy may perhaps be re-established in France by force, it may perhaps be hatched hereafter out of new circumstances which no one canfore see to-day; but, assuredly, the 16th of May has no power of engendering it, and was not intended to engender it, even if there were but one pretender, or even if the elections were to produce a majority composed exclusively of the adherents of one party, even then the majority would not be master of the position, for it would have to obtain the approval of the Senate in favor of its candidate to the throne. But as there are two pretenders, and a Constitutional group besides, representing the defunct Orleanists; as the majority would necessarily be composed, in varying proportions, of supporters of each of the three ambitions; and as, finally, it is eminently unlikely that the Conservatives will obtain a majority at all, — it cannot reasonably be anticipated that the new Chamber will be able to vote away the Republic. Even if the Monarchical theory were a pure abstract idea in France, without any preference for a dynasty, a name, a flag, a press, a person, or a principle, even then it is most improbable, in the present state of opinion, that the united advocates of the idea would be able to upset the

Republic. But to suppose that any one of the temporarily associated though inherently hostile components of the "Conservative Union" can carry its claimant to power by parliamentary action alone, in the teeth of the rival Monarchical parties and of the Republicans as well, is to imagine more than the frequent realization in France of the improbable and the difficult justifies us in conceiving.

Under such conditions as these it cannot be seriously urged that the Marshal, when he took his first step in the matter, indulged the dream of placing a crown on the head of either Henry V. or Napoleon IV. Other people have, perhaps, formed hopes of that sort since, but the Marshal and his ministers cannot be supposed to have been foolish enough to look forward to such an impossibility. Our belief is that, so far as its original objects and intentions were concerned, the Act of the 16th May was no more Monarchical than it was Conservative.

We conceive it to have been simply an outbreak of unreasoned duty on the part of the Marshal. Consequently, as we view the question, the movement of the 16th May was, in its origin, nothing more than a personal outburst against an imaginary danger; and though the members of the Monarchical factions are now attempting to extract the most they can out of it for themselves, we see no reason for accusing the Marshal of having wished to serve their purposes, or to destroy the Republic over which he presides.

But directly we turn our eyes from the supposed intention of the Marshal to the means which he has allowed to be employed for carrying out those intentions, the whole question changes its aspect, for nothing can be more regrettable and more blamable, as regards both policy and honesty, than the acts of the ministers to whom the Marshal has confided the direction of his attack against Radicalism. Instead of acting on the doctrine which is now accepted everywhere outside France, that public discussion constitutes the surest, the safest, and the most effective obstacle that can be thrown in the way of political follies, and that it supplies the natural form of appeal from the exaggerations of a minority to the common-sense of the people at large, these ministers have endeavored to stop discussion and to put force into its place. They pretend, like most of the so-called Conservatives of

France, that though discussion may suffice in other lands, it affords no protection whatever here ; the reason being, according to them, that neither universal suffrage nor French character is amenable to reason. They insist that French electors must be "guided" to the poll, that they must be told how to vote, and that all the forms of administrative pressure must be utilized in order to induce them to follow the advice which is offered to them by the government. This was the system employed by Napoleon III. This is the system which the Ministry of the 16th May is applying, with far more violence than ever the Empire dared to use, and which, worse than all, it is applying for the exclusive benefit of Royalist and Imperialist candidates.

Even if the system of governmental pressure on electors were directed solely against Radicalism, even if it were utilized in favor of moderate Republican candidates only, it would even then be an indefensible and unconstitutional abuse of power. But that abuse of power becomes absolutely monstrous when it is employed by the government of a Republic against Republicans and in favor of Monarchical candidates alone. Yet that is what the government of Marshal MacMahon is doing at this moment. After publicly protesting that its whole efforts were to be set going against Radicalism, it is now concentrating them with the bitterest animosity against the election of Republican deputies of any kind whatever. The result is, that though we are convinced the Marshal really intended at first to maintain the Republic, and that he fully recognized the hopelessness of any attempt at Monarchical restoration by parliamentary means, he stands now before the world as the supporter of an electoral policy of which the declared object is to prevent Republicans from being elected.

And really, according to our view of the whole affair, it is quite natural, and even inevitable, that he should have arrived at this strange position. He began by an undefined onslaught against an enemy which his own ministers declared to be almost invisible and intangible, but he has been led on by degrees, as frequently happens in such cases, to a defined attack against a totally different foe. In order to make war on Radicalism, he called the Conservatives to his aid ; but, as the Conservatives are all Monarchists, they only joined him on condition of trying to utilize the opportunity for upsetting the Republic. And as French Conserva-

tism is in reality absolutism ; as it is made up of retrograde class prejudices ; as it is a remnant of the old spirit of the *noblesse*, which hates innovation ; as it cannot bring itself to accept controversy or publicity ; as, in its eyes, publicity means a still further spreading of "detestable ideas,"—it of course proclaims that the only way to deal with its opponents is to silence them by force. In its terror of revolution from below, it shouts out for revolution from above, and it has done so this time in a fashion which has exposed Marshal MacMahon to the accusation of seeking to destroy the Republic of which he is the President.

Now it so happens that there is a curious example before us, in France itself, of the effects of the use of force in questions of this kind. During the Second Empire, which was certainly a government of force, we heard constantly of the growth of Socialism in France ; we were told that the desire of seizing the properties of the rich for division amongst the poor was becoming general there, and that if it were not compressed with energy it would burst out destructively. Well, the Empire has disappeared, and, wonderful to relate, Socialism has disappeared with it ! No more Socialism is to be found in France. It could not support the examination which free institutions turned upon it, so it vanished. It may be answered of course by French Conservatives that its place has been taken by Radicalism, and that France has gained nothing by the change. But that reply does not affect the fact that directly force ceased to be the principle of government, directly discussion became possible, the particular form of danger presented by Socialism at once died out. It transferred its home to Germany and Russia, as if its natural disposition were to place itself in opposition to governments of force, wherever it can find them.

Now surely it may be argued that if the admission of free discussion has thus already choked Socialism, it would in all probability produce in time an analogous effect on the other political extravagances which ardent imaginations may successively invent. Surely there ought to be an encouraging symptom for French Conservatives in the melting away of Socialism ; surely there ought to be in this experience an evidence of the corroding action which is exercised on all utopias by simply turning strong illumination on them. Like other speculative exaggerations, the follies of Radicalism thrive best when they are left unexamined ; light is

always dangerous to them, and is not unfrequently fatal. But the use of light as a defensive arm necessarily implies confidence and courage in those who employ it; it indicates entire trust in their own position, their own strength, their own capacity; tremblers shrink from it lest it should do more harm to themselves than to their foes. For these reasons French Conservatives do not dare to adopt light as their weapon; they are all faint-hearted; they show us distinctly by their acts that they have no faith either in themselves or in their cause or in the true armory of Conservatism. They have always cried out for the aid of force, and they are doing it again now.

This time, indeed, they are surpassing the arbitrariness of the Second Empire. The whole administration of the country (and we know what an all-absorbing, all-controlling machine the French administration is) has been converted into an electoral agency. The French newspapers are full each day of new tales of violent action on the part of ministers, prefects, and their subordinates, and of government inventions for influencing the choice of the voters. It is the imperial system applied again, but without its purpose. And if Napoleon III., with his name, his prestige, and his power, was unable to maintain a government by force, is it to be expected that the present temporary organization, which has neither name nor prestige, will succeed any better? France has become a laboratory in which new experiments are tried, but it is not just to apply to her a second time a series of old experiments, which have failed already. The system of compression produced Sedan, and was followed by the Commune. What can France expect to gain by setting it to work again?

That system sets the example of contempt for the very rules whose observance constitutes the essence of true Conservatism, and yet it claims to be Conservative! This strange contradiction makes us wonder if really there are any Conservatives in France at all. There are Tories in abundance, but where are the Conservatives? There is no reason whatever why they should not be found in France, as they are elsewhere, for Conservatism is, by its nature, as universal as, by its uses, it is universally necessary. Modern government could no more proceed in safety without it than a ship could navigate without a rudder, or a coach go down a hill without a drag. But its functions are as clearly defined as

those of a rudder or a drag, and a "revolution from above" is clearly not one of them.

Is it, perchance, because real Conservatism is understood or practised by no one in France, because it acts there as a handcuff, and not as a rudder or a drag, that France has never yet been able to establish a well-balanced and durable government? One is tempted to think so, and to attribute the constantly recurring political difficulties of the French to the insufficiencies of their Conservatism, even more than to the extravagances of their Radicalism.

Before this article is published the results of the elections will be known. But whatever be these results, they will provide no solution of the difficulties of the position. If the Conservatives obtain a majority, they will drag the country into new dynastic quarrels. If the Liberals retain their ascendancy, they will assuredly employ it, not only to consolidate the Republic, but also to tie the hands of the Conservatives for the future. In both cases the cause of true liberty will suffer.

The responsibility of the damage done to France and to liberty will rest on the heads of the men who originated the folly of the 16th of May.

A PARIS RESIDENT.